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Abstract
The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested by
simultaneous estimation of the causes and effect of insider ownership among the largest
continental European companies. Controlling for nation and industry effects insider
ownership (measured by the fraction of  “closely held” shares) is found to have a positive
effect on market valuation (market-to-book values). And market valuation is found to have a
positive feedback effect on the level of insider ownership.  The findings provide empirical
support for a theoretical model proposed by La Porta et al (1999). But the results are also
found to be sensitive to owner identity: while a higher level of financial and corporate insider
ownership is found to increase market valuation, family ownership has no significant effect,
and a higher level of government ownership is found to reduce market valuation.
3The Causal Relationship between Insider Ownership, Owner Identity
and Market Valuation among the Largest European Companies
Historically, an enormous number of papers have examined the effect of ownership structure
on economic performance measures using single equation regression models (Short 1994).
But recently a second generation of studies applying simultaneous equation models have
picked up on a point raised by Harold Demsetz (1983) that ownership is an endogenous
variable, and that this needs to be taken into account when estimating its effect on
performance (Loderer and Martin 1997; Cho 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999).
The simultaneous equation models have generally found the impact of insider ownership on
performance to be insignificant, which confirms the intuition voiced by Demsetz (1983) that
there should be no impact in equilibrium since this would imply that owners would profit by
reshuffling their portfolios. In particular, one might expect a significant reverse feedback
from market valuation to the level of insider ownership as owners react to good or bad
performance by buying or selling shares.
This paper contributes to the simultaneous equations literature. But while previous studies
have used US data this paper extends the scope of analysis to continental European firms that
operate in a different institutional setting. Contrary to previous studies we find that insider
ownership (measured by the fraction of closely held shares) has a positive effect on market
valuation (market-to-book values) even after taking into account the observed positive
feedback of market valuation effect on insider ownership. Furthermore, we stress the
importance of  “identity of owner-effects” arguing that the identity of the insiders – e.g.
family, government, or financial - affects the causal relationship between insider ownership
4and market valuation.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Theoretically, it might be argued that higher insider ownership implies better incentives to
monitor, greater incentive alignment and therefore higher expected profits and share prices.
But higher insider ownership may also imply greater managerial entrenchment, diversion of
funds and thereby lower efficiency (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Morck et al 1988). It is also
possible that these effects combine into a non-linear (bell-shaped) relationship  – positive for
small levels of insider ownership because of greater incentive alignment, negative for high
levels because of increasing managerial entrenchment, and near a value-maximizing optimum
the marginal effect of changes in insider ownership could theoretically be zero (Demsetz and
Lehn 1985).  Therefore, the theoretical effect of insider ownership on market valuation is a
priori indeterminate.
Furthermore, there may also be significant reverse feedback from market valuation to
ownership structure.  For example, the market valuation of a company’s shares may affect the
level of insider ownership.  Depending on the supply curve for individual stocks (Zeckhouser
& Pound 1990), insiders may be more tempted to sell parts of their shares in a particular firm
when share prices are high relative to expectations. Managers and other controlling
shareholder may trade off on-the-job consumption for monetary compensation. The
immediate gains to selling out are larger and the expected future gains may be lower for a
higher share price. Furthermore, companies seem more likely to issue stock to the market and
thereby reduce the level of insider ownership when the market for their shares is good (i.e.
when share prices are high).  Finally, when caused by inefficient management a decreasing
5share price should in theory invite raiders and controlling shareholders to increase their
holdings to repair the problem. These arguments point to a negative relationship between
market valuation and insider ownership. But it is also conceivable that outside shareholders
choose to reward the insiders for good past performance (ex post settling up) and that high
market valuation will therefore tend to lead to higher levels of insider ownership (Kole 1996).
Furthermore, higher market value makes it possible to finance a given level of investment
with a smaller amount of stock to outsider owners (La Porta et al. 1999b) – an argument we
shall shortly present more formally.  Therefore, the nature of the reverse effect from market
valuation to insider ownership is also theoretically disputed.
A large number of empirical papers have studied the relationship between insider ownership
and market valuation/economic performance. Previous research based on “single equation
models” generally found a positive or perhaps insignificant relationship between insider
ownership and economic performance, at least for low levels of insider ownership (Short
1994).  Some also found non-linear relationships between managerial ownership and market
valuation (e.g. Morck et al. 1988, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Thomsen and Pedersen
2000).   But, as mentioned, more recent simultaneous estimations of the “causes and
consequences” of insider ownership have found insignificant performance effects (Loderer
and Martin 1997, Cho 1998, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999).
Loderer and Martin (1997) examine both Tobin’s Q-values and abnormal stock returns to 867
acquisitions made by companies listed in the US over the period 1978-1988. They find a
weak concave effect of director ownership on both measures estimated by simple regression.
However, the relationship becomes insignificant when a simultaneous two-equation model is
estimated that includes firm size and earnings volatility as determinants of director
6ownership. Abnormal acquisition returns are found to have a significant positive effect on
director ownership whereas Q-values are found to have a significant negative effect. The
authors interpret these results as evidence that managers have inside knowledge and increase
their shareholdings prior to good acquisitions whereas high share prices and Q-values induce
them to sell out.
Cho (1998) examines investment as an intermediate variable between director ownership and
performance measured by Q-values. On a sample of 326 Fortune 500 firms in 1991 he finds
that Q-values have a positive impact on director ownership and that director ownership has a
significant non-monotonous effect on investment, which again has a positive impact on Q-
values. When taking this into account in a 3-equation model simultaneously determining
director ownership, Q-values and investment, the non-monotonous effect of ownership
structure on Q-values becomes insignificant.
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) use a panel of 300 Compustat firms over the period
1982-1992 to control for fixed firm effects as an indicator of unobserved firm heterogeneity
which influences both ownership structure and Q-values.  They find a significant impact of
director ownership on Q-values even after controlling for some observable determinants of
ownership structure, but the impact becomes insignificant when the fixed firm effects are
taken into account.
In summary, empirical research has tended to find a positive direct effect of insider
ownership or similar measures such a director ownership, ownership concentration or owner-
control dummies. But the effect has tended to become insignificant when attempts were made
to control for the determinants of ownership structure.
7A model
One problem with previous research in this area is the lack of a solid theoretical foundation.
In this paper we rely on a model proposed by La Porta, Shleifer, Silanes, and Vishny (1999b)
– henceforth the LSSV model - to formulate hypotheses for empirical testing. In their model
an insider can choose to divert a share - s  - of the firm’s gross value creation (RI) from the
investors to other goals (private on-the-job consumption, the benefit of non-owner
stakeholders, political objectives or any other non value maximizing goal). But the diversion
comes at a cost c, which increases in s: c(s), cs> 0, css> 0.  The optimal level of non profit
maximizing behaviour s* then depends on the marginal costs of profit diversion and the
insider’s share of the cash flow which we denote his “ownership share”.
The relevant findings can be adapted to this paper in the following equations:
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8Here, equation 1 describes the utility maximizing choice of s by an insider. The gross value
created by the firm is R (R=rate of return, I=amount invested). Of that sRI is diverted by the
insider to other goals at a cost c(s)RI proportional to the value creation RI and increasing in s.
The insider maximizes the sum of his share of the value creation net of diversion α(1-s)RI
plus the diverted funds sRI minus the costs of diversion c(s)RI. Equation 2 solves the first
order condition for this maximization problem. Equation 3 differentiates equation 2 by α to
show that the optimal level of diversion decreases with the insider’s ownership share.
Equation 4 defines the market valuation ratio Q as the gross value creation net of profit
diversion over the amount of money invested (I). Equation 5 differentiates equation 4 to show
that market valuation increases in the insider’s ownership share α. The argument is the
classical incentive alignment argument: insider incentives will be more closely aligned with
value maximization for outside investors if they themselves have a higher ownership share of
the insiders.
While the first five equations treat α as exogenously given, equation 6 derives the optimal
ownership share as a function of market valuation. It is assumed that outsider investors will
require at least to break even before they invest – i.e. to get a return net of profit diversion
and net of dividends to the insiders (1-α)(1-s*) RI which at least covers the amount of money
- I - they have to invest.  So (1-α)(1-s*)RI = I. By the definition of Q the left hand side of this
equation equals (1-α)QI so α can be written as a function of Q. Equation 7 differentiates this
function to show that the implied relationship between ownership share and market valuation
is positive. The argument is that a given level of investment can be financed by issuing less
equity to the public when market valuation is high. And ceteris paribus the minimal equity
share is preferred because it minimizes the cost of profit diversion.
9The model has two important implications for this paper. 1) Market valuation (Q) increases
with the insider’s ownership share. 2) The optimal ownership share α* increases with market
valuation. This gives rise to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a.  Market valuation has a positive effect on the level of insider ownership.
Hypothesis 1b. The level of insider ownership has a positive effect on market valuation.
The emphasis on the incentive alignment argument indicates a view of insider ownership that
in some ways resembles the pecking order theory of corporate finance (Myers and Majluf
1984) according to which managers prefer to avoid financing projects by issuing equity to
outside investors. In the LSSV model insider ownership is strictly preferable because of
incentive alignment, so it is optimal to allocate as much equity as possible to the insiders and
the more so the higher the market valuation will be. The main reason for this clarity is that
the model abstracts from risk and risk aversion, which is the classical argument for sharing
ownership with outside investors. The model also emphasises cash flow rights and their
implications for economic incentives but abstracts from the control rights of ownership (firms
are assumed to be controlled by the insiders in any case).
Owner identity
Another gap in the existing research (surveyed above) is that it is almost entirely based on US
evidence. But a priori it cannot be taken for granted that the findings will hold in other
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institutional settings. In a series of influential papers La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(henceforth La Porta et al.) have argued that national legal systems differ with regard to
investor protection, and that this has implications for insider ownership and market valuation.
Others have emphasized the importance of a wider set of institutional differences – including
the structure of the financial system, financial regulation and complementary institutions
(Roe 1991, 1994, Whitley 1994, Pedersen and Thomsen 1997, 1999a) which in effect make
each nation a unique case.   National differences have a strong influence on both ownership
structure and market valuation, and it cannot be taken for granted that they do not influence
the functional relationship between them.  Roe (1994) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) find
strong nation effects on corporate ownership structure.  Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) also
find strong nation effects on the market valuation of European companies. La Porta et al.
(1998, 1999a) argue that relatively weak systemic investor protection in civil law systems
leads to higher levels of insider ownership (control by large owners) compared to common
law systems, because control by large owners functions as an alternative control mechanism
to legal protection. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1999b) argue that systemic investor
protection has a positive impact on market valuation because investor protection increases
insider owners´ costs of diverting resources to their private benefit. Specifically, they argue
that investors are better protected in common law regimes and that share valuation therefore
tends to be higher in common law compared to civil law systems.
Because of nation effects it cannot be taken for granted that the relationship between
ownership structure and economic performance is the same in the US and in continental
Europe.  In this paper we focus on the critical importance of owner identity, which appears to
have been overlooked in most extant research (despite the call for more research in Short
(1994)).  For example, a high level of government ownership could have very different
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implications for market valuation compared to a high level of managerial ownership.
Likewise it could very well have different implications for company behaviour if the largest
owner is a family, a bank or another corporation. This point has been stressed by Gedajlovich
(1993) and Thomsen and Pedersen (1998, 2000). While the literature (quoted above) may
reflect a US institutional setting in which large companies are normally controlled by
institutional investors or other portfolio investors with similar behavioural characteristics,
European companies have much higher levels of insider ownership which means that the
identity of the largest owner matters correspondingly more.
Following previous work based on Hansmann (1996) we expect the largest owner to
influence company objectives according to the preferences of that owner category. In
addition to their ownership interest in shareholder value the preferences are assumed to be
influenced by other economic relations (the “stakeholder interest”), which that owner
category may have with the firm.  We distinguish between four owner categories: Financial
institutions, (non-Financial) Companies, Families and Governments. We categorize
companies in our sample by their identity in 1991 (before the beginning of our data window
1992-1995) leaving out companies belonging to other ownership categories – e.g.
cooperatives.
Families or single individuals are the prototype insiders referred to by La Porta et al. (1999b)
because single owners or family members often play a dual role as managers and owners, if
they own large amounts of shares. In other words, their marginal cost of profit diversion are
presumably small and therefore ownership share should have a relatively strong effect on
market valuation for family-managed companies. However, the performance effects of family
ownership are disputed. Since single owners and families typically invest a disproportionate
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share of their wealth in the company, family-owned companies may be relatively risk averse,
and they are more likely to be capital-rationed than outsider-controlled companies which
could detract from their economic performance. Furthermore the private utility that families
derive from running the company may go beyond what they can pocket at the expense of
minority shareholders. In support of the expropriation hypothesis, Johnson et al. (1985) found
that the stock market reacted favourably to unexpected death of CEOs with large ownership
stakes.  On the other hand, families sometimes make firm specific investments in human
capital (Maug 1996) which create long-term ties to the company, and which may be value-
increasing. Nickel et al. (1997) found no effects of family ownership on productivity, and
Gorriz and Fumas (1996) found a positive effect. For empirical testing we stick to the LSSV
model and propose the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a.  Market valuation has a positive effect on family ownership.
Hypothesis 2b. Family ownership has a positive effect on market valuation.
Financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment companies)
are assumed to be portfolio investors whose main objective is shareholder value.  This means
that they can to a large extent be regarded as outsiders. To be sure there are exceptions to this
rule. For example, banks may value the security of their loans and other business relations
with the company as much as their owner interest. And pension funds may have links to trade
unions or governments that make them extra sensitive to political concerns like job safety or
the public image of the companies that they invest in. Nevertheless, holding a large portfolio
of shares at arms length distance and being evaluated regularly on their financial results
compared to other institutions will arguably make financial institutions likely to be strongly
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concerned with shareholder value.  Furthermore financial investors are generally subjected to
special regulation and supervision by government organizations (ministries of finance,
securities and exchange commissions and the like). In other words, their marginal cost of
value diversion is presumably relatively high, which should lead to a positive, but relatively
small effect of ownership share on market valuation (equation 5).  In the same way, high
profit diversion costs could theoretically imply a low level of value diversion and therefore
higher share value and higher ownership share for financial owners relative to other
ownership categories, while the marginal effect of share valuation on ownership share should
tend to be smaller than for other categories given the higher share value. We therefore
propose the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a.  Market valuation has a small positive effect on financial investor ownership.
Hypothesis 3b. Financial investor ownership has a positive effect on market valuation.
One problem with these hypotheses is that they appear to be inconsistent with previous
research. For example Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) argued that a higher level of ownership
by a financial institution will give that institution more voting power and stronger incentives
to monitor the incumbent management (the “real” insiders), and that this will imply a greater
pressure to maximise shareholder value. In support they reported that market valuation
tended to increase with the ownership share of dominant financial institutions. Nickel et al.
(1997) found a positive productivity impact of financial ownership. In the case of bank
ownership Cable (1985) found a positive performance effect among West German firms, and
Hoshi et al. (1990) and Ramirez (1995) found that members of bank-based business groups
were less likely to be credit-rationed.
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An alternative interpretation may be to simply define financial owners as outsiders because
their costs of profit diversion are prohibitive. In that case an increase in financial investor
ownership would imply a decrease in insider ownership by other owner categories, which
would imply a negative relationship between financial ownership and market valuation given
lower costs of profit dispersion for the insiders.  This also contradicts previous research.
It may therefore be necessary to modify the LSSV model to understand the causes and
consequences of financial ownership. For example, the wealth effects may imply that
financial institutions and the companies that they own appear to be less likely to be capital-
rationed than companies whose owners have less direct access to capital. And, because of
financial regulation and supervision they may be forced to invest “prudently” in relatively
liquid, high value blue chip shares.  Finally, the LSSV model is concerned with the
implications of cash flow rights and abstracts from the control rights of ownership. If a higher
ownership share implies an increase in the control of shareholder value maximising financial
owners this may have positive effect on market valuation.
(Non-financial) companies sometimes hold shares in other companies as part of cross-
ownership or company group structures. Because company owners often have business ties
with the companies that they own, they come closer to being classical insider-owners than
financial institutions and their costs of profit diversion are presumably small which should
indicate a relatively large positive performance effect of increasing ownership share
(equation 5). Likewise,  a relatively high expected profit diversion should indicate a positive,
and relatively large effect of market valuation on corporate ownership share.  Corporate
ownership ties are an integral feature of the Japanese Keiretsu as well French  cross-holding
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structures or Swedish business groups (Kester 1992, Charkham 1994). Vertical ties between
companies at different stages of the value chain/system make economic sense under
conditions of high asset specificity and transaction frequency (Williamson 1995).  In
particular corporate ownership ties may be expected to facilitate knowledge transfers between
the affiliated companies. The relationship between a foreign parent company and a subsidiary
can be interpreted in this way if the subsidiary markets and distributes products produced or
developed by the parent company.  The owner company has stronger incentives to transfer
proprietary resources to the subsidiary/affiliate (Caves 1996), which should tend to increase
its market valuation. Nevertheless, as recognised by Williamson (1985) in the case of full
integration into a company hierarchy or by Kester (1992) in the case of more loosely
affiliated members of a company group, the advantages of business group membership come
at a cost, for example loss of flexibility and risk of deficient mutual monitoring. Hundley and
Jacobson´s recent finding (1998) that Keiretsu members do worse in terms of export
performance than non-members indicates that the costs may sometimes exceed the benefits.
Similarly, the impact of market value on company ownership also appears to be uncertain.
Non-financial companies are likely to have lower costs of capital than individuals or families,
but higher than financial investors. For empirical testing we propose the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4a.  Market valuation has a positive effect on company ownership.
Hypothesis 4b. Company ownership has a positive effect on market valuation.
Government organizations are likely to be more sensitive to political concerns than other
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ownership categories, which essentially means that a higher ownership share will not
necessarily function as a deterrent against profit diversion. The theoretical literature (e.g.
Shepherd (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1996)) and common
sense suggest that governments are likely to pay special attention to political goals such as
low output prices, employment or external effects – many of which may be negatively
correlated with financial performance. In fact, non profit-maximizing behaviour is a key
rationale for government ownership in welfare economics (e.g. Arrow 1969, Shepherd 1989),
since government intervention is expected to correct market failures (e.g. Shepherd 1989).
Ceteris paribus, the government-owned enterprises may therefore be expected to be low
performers in terms of conventional performance measures.  A high level of government
ownership could therefore very well be associated with relatively low market valuation.
Likewise the determinants of government ownership should in theory differ from
determinants of private ownership. Governments might have a preference for owning
companies that are not commercially viable (i.e. relatively unprofitable) - for example to
prevent job losses or to maintain production of indispensable services. Therefore we propose
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5a. Market valuation has a negative effect on government ownership.
Hypothesis 5b. Government ownership has a negative effect on market valuation.
The hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.
// INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE //
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Control Variables
Previous research has found that ownership structure is sensitive to both nation and industry
effects (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997, Thomsen and Pedersen 1998). In order to filter out
these effects we construct nation and industry indices (average levels of insider ownership by
industry and nation) and control for these indices when estimating the causes of insider
ownership.  In addition we test for the effect of company size and firm specific uncertainty,
which have previously been found to influence corporate ownership structures both in the
USA and in continental Europe (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Pedersen and Thomsen 1999a). We
follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in using firm size (assets) as a proxy for firm specific risk,
higher levels of which should tend to lower the level of insider ownership. We also use their
noise variable (standard deviation of the return on equity) as a measure of uncertainty, higher
levels of which arguably tend to aggravate the agency problem and to provide a role for
monitoring by insider owners up to a point beyond which the uncertainty begins to lower the
value of. Like Demsetz and Lehn we therefore use a quadratic specification: insider
ownership = a*noise + b*noise squared, and we expect a to be positive and b to be negative.
Likewise, market to book values may differ for reasons unrelated to the level of insider
ownership in individual companies. Because of industry differences with regard to the
intensity of competition and the importance of immaterial assets like knowledge capital,
reputation or brand equity, market-to-book values tend to vary by industry. Moreover,
market-to-book values may differ because of nation effects related to the size and liquidity of
the stock market as well as macroeconomic variables.  Again we construct nation and
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industry indices (average levels of market-to-book value for industry and nation) and control
for these indices when estimating the effects of insider ownership. We also control for firm
growth as an indicator of firm specific variables that are not, or at least only indirectly related
to ownership structure.  Finally we control for the effects of capital structure with the
underlying hypothesis that a higher debt equity ratio implies a higher debt pressure that could
curb agency problems and raise market value (Jensen 1989, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000).
 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To test our hypotheses we use a database containing information on ownership structures of
the largest non-financial companies in continental Europe (including Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden). The
companies studied are the largest independent, non-financial ownership units in terms of
turnover in these countries. In 1991 the ownership structure (e.g. the ownership share and the
identity of the largest owner) was identified for all of the 100 largest companies in each of
these countries. Many different sources including local directories for each country were
applied in order to identify the ownership structure for each company (see Pedersen and
Thomsen 1997 for more information).
We link this database on ownership structure with the Worldscope database (Worldscope,
annually) in order to obtain market data and accounting figures for each company. However,
market data is only available for companies listed on the stock exchange and even many of
the largest companies (e.g. cooperatives, foreign owned and foundation owned companies)
were not listed. Therefore, due to missing values (mainly lack of market data) the usable
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sample was reduced to a total of 214 companies. The largest number of companies was from
France (33) and Germany (32) while the lowest number of companies was from the smaller
countries: Austria (4) and Denmark (10).
Based on the information on ownership structure in 1991 each company was categorized
according to the identity of the inside owner(s). The dominant inside owner(s) were
persons/families in 61 companies, financial institutions in 37 companies, governments in 30
companies and other corporations in 86 companies.
The database contains observations of the identity of the inside owners (mainly the largest
owner), the fraction shares held by “insiders” (i.e. closely held shares), main industry  (4-digit
ISIC-Code), nation and four annual observations (1992-1995) of market-to-book value, total
assets, sales growth, debt-equity ratio and return on equity.  From these figures we calculate
the noise/uncertainty variable (the standard deviation of return on equity) as well as industry
and nation indices for market-to-book values and level of insider ownership. A description of
the variables is found in Table 2.  The data set contains 214 companies over 3 years (we used
one year to construct a lagged variable) and a total of 642 firm-year observations.
// INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE //
Insider ownership represents  “the shares held by insiders “ (Worldscope 1994) including
officers, directors and their families, shares held in trust, shares held by another corporation
(except in a fiduciary duty by banks), shares held by pension/benefit plans or by individuals
who hold more than 5%. This measure is somewhat broader than the director ownership
variable used in many previous studies since it involves the holdings of other large investors
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apart from management including financial institutions, other corporations and organizations.
Since the ownership share is confined to the interval between 0 and 100 we use a logit
transformation of the variable in the statistical analysis (see Table 2).
Table 3 provides a correlation matrix and some descriptive statistics.
// INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE //
The average level of insider ownership is quite high: 46% of the shares in even these very
large companies tend to be closely held. This accords with previous research (e.g. Pedersen
and Thomsen 1997, La Porta et al. 1998), which has found high levels of insider ownership
outside the Anglo-American part of the world.
Insider ownership is positively related to present and lagged measures of market valuation (in
line with hypothesis 1). As in previous work (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn 1985) it is positively
correlated with uncertainty/noise (measured by the standard deviation of return on equity)
and negatively, but insignificantly, correlated with company size (assets).
Our market valuation measure, market-to-book value, is negatively correlated with the
noise/uncertainty variable (a measure of firm specific uncertainty/risk). It is also negatively
correlated with the debt/equity ratio which tends to contradict previous findings in which the
debt /equity ratio was seen as a control mechanism directed at agency problems (e.g. Jensen
1989) and was found to increase market-to-book values. One reason could be that debt plays
a different role in continental Europe because the institutional setting differs (for example
with regard to the level of insider ownership, the legal system, the role of banks and other
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credit institutions).  There is also a positive and significant association with company size
(assets) and sales growth, perhaps because the stock market prefers large and liquid, high
growth (blue chip) shares.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We estimate 3 stage least squares simultaneous equation models of the following type:
1. Insider ownership (t) =  Market-to-Book Value (t-1) + control variables and noise
2. Market-to-book value (t) = Insider ownership (t) + other control variables and noise
The assumption here is that market to book value at the end of last year (t-1) along with some
control variables influence the level of insider ownership this year, which may again along
with other control variables influence the level of market valuation at the end of this year.
Since insider ownership is measured during the year, and since insider ownership presumably
adjust to market valuation with some lag, whereas market valuation reacts quickly
(instantaneously) to changes in ownership, we believe this (bloc recursive) model structure to
be the most appropriate. But we also experimented with simultaneous determination of
market to book value (t) and insider ownership (t), which produced qualitatively similar
results to the ones reported here.
Table 4 contains the main model controlling for nation and industry indices.
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// INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE //
Market valuation is found to have a positive impact on insider ownership (in line with
hypothesis 1a).  The control variables behave as predicted. Company size tends to lower the
percentage of insider ownership (presumably because the absolute risk of holding a given
fraction of the shares is larger in large companies). Also, the level of insider ownership tends
to first increase and then decrease in the level of uncertainty in line with what was predicted
and supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
In the performance equation insider ownership is found to have a positive effect on market
valuation (in line with hypothesis 1b). The control variables behave as predicted except for an
insignificant effect of the debt/equity ratio, which indicates that debt does not function as an
agency control mechanism for companies in continental Europe. One explanation may be that
a high level of ownership concentration already disciplines European managers. More
generally, capital and ownership structure should probably be regarded as jointly determined
in a more complex model than the one estimated here.
Broadly speaking the overall estimates appear to be consistent with the predictions of the
LSSV model.  Excluding the nation and industry indices did not qualitatively change the
results.
Identity effects
We also estimate the simultaneous equation model separately by the identity of the insider
owners to test for differences between owner categories.
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// INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE //
Family insider ownership is found to increase with market valuation (in support of
hypothesis 2a), and family ownership is found to have an insignificant effect on market
valuation (hypothesis 2b. is rejected). Apparently, there are countervailing forces at work. For
example, risk aversion and capital rationing may reduce the competitiveness of closely held
family-owned firms.  The effect of market valuation on insider ownership is significantly
smaller than the effect on financial or company ownership which could indicate that higher
costs of capital make it relatively more costly for family owners to maintain a given
ownership share of a high value company.
As predicted, financial insider ownership is found to increase with market valuation and
also by itself to exert a positive influence on market valuation (hypotheses 3a. and 3b are
supported). According to the LSSV model higher market valuation makes it possible for the
insiders to maintain a higher ownership share, because it is possible for the insiders to finance
the necessary investment by issuing fewer shares to outsiders. And a higher share of the cash
flow rights gives insiders an incentive to maximise shareholder value rather than their private
utility. An alternative interpretation is that financial investors prefer to invest in (blue chip)
companies whose high value creation potential is already appreciated by the market and that
they use their owner influence to increase shareholder value.
However, contrary to what we would expect from the LSSV model both effects are
numerically quite strong – and stronger than for other owner identities. An increase in market
valuation of one standard deviation is estimated to increase insider ownership by slightly less
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than half an insider ownership standard deviation, whereas an increase in insider ownership
of one standard deviation is expected to increase market valuation by a little more than half a
standard deviation. Theoretically, more cash flow rights should not change the objectives of
financial investors very much because their profit diversion costs are presumably high.
Insider ownership by a non-financial corporation is found to be higher the higher the
market value and also to exert a positive influence on market valuation (hypotheses 4a and
4b. are supported). Compared to financial ownership the effect of market value on company
ownership is somewhat smaller which might indicate higher costs of capital among non-
financial companies. But the difference is not significant. In contrast, the positive effect of
company insider ownership on market valuation is estimated to be much less than the effect
of insider ownership by financial institutions, and the difference is significant. This is
contrary to what we would expect from the LSSV model if we assume that non-financial
corporate owners have lower costs of profit dispersion compared to financial owners.
Apparently the market is less certain that corporate owners will benefit shareholder value.
Finally, as predicted, government ownership is found to follow a different logic compared
to the other, private ownership categories. Low market valuation is found to increase the level
of government ownership, and government ownership is found to lower market valuation. We
interpret this to indicate that governments more often than private owners pursue non-value
maximizing goals and are more likely than private business to take an ownership interest in
unprofitable companies. While this might indicate inferior performance in government-
owned companies, it is not clear that governments should necessarily aim for shareholder
value creation. On the contrary, there may be a special rationale for government ownership in
circumstances when markets fail and private enterprise is commercially unviable.
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DISCUSSION
This paper has contributed to the ongoing discussion on the causal link between ownership
structure and market valuation.
The results may be summarized as follows.  Generally, in this sample of continental
European companies 1992-1995, market valuation tends to increase the level of insider
ownership, and insider ownership tends to increase market valuation.  These results hold for
financial and corporate ownership. But family ownership has no significant effect on
performance, and for government ownership the results are reversed indicating presumably
that governments do not aim for shareholder value creation.
We conclude that the LSSV model is generally supported by our findings, but that the causal
relationship between insider ownership and market valuation depends on owner identity.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the parameter estimates did not correspond to our assumptions
on the relative costs of profit diversion. This indicates that the causal relationship between
insider ownership and market valuation is also affected by other forces such as risk
aversion/wealth effects and the effects of ownership on corporate control.
A strong feature in the LSSV model is its ability to correctly predict a strong positive effect
of market valuation on insider ownership whereas several other arguments (e.g. risk aversion)
would tend to point in the opposite direction. The alternative argument for a positive effect
suggested by Kole (1997) – that insiders are rewarded ex post by a higher ownership share
for their prior performance – appears to be more directly concerned with the effect of changes
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in market value on changes in insider ownership (for example as an effect of executive
compensation by stock options). The intuition behind the formal argument appears to be that
insider owners have an ownership preference- they prefer to share as little as possible of their
ownership with outsiders and that high market valuation will allow them to attract the capital
that they need with less dilution of their cash flow/ownership rights.  The logic of the
argument has a parallel in the pecking order theory of finance according to which managers
prefer to use other sources of finance than new equity.  In the LSSV model the ownership
preference is seen as a consequence of incentive alignment with outside owners - the insiders
have a stronger incentive to maximise shareholder value when their share of net cash flow is
high. But the insider ownership preference may also be attributable to other motives. For
example, the insider owners may be able to better influence the company in accordance with
their preferences if they maintain a high ownership share.  This may also be the case if the
insiders aim to maximise shareholder value whereas other ownership categories are less so
inclined.
Another advantage of the LSSM model is that it is an equilibrium model, which takes
into consideration the Demsetz (1983) critique that ownership structure is not exogenously
given but rather an efficient response to the relative costs and benefits of ownership. The
findings indicate that shareholder value could be increased by transferring ownership from
governments and families to financial institutions.  But the incumbent insiders may not want
to adjust their holdings to maximize shareholder value if they also value the private utility or
political gains associated with ownership.
Our results differ significantly from previous research on US data (Loderer and Martin 1997,
Cho 1998, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999) that found the effect of insider ownership
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on market valuation to be insignificant. One plausible reason is suggested by La Porta et al
(1999b). If the cost of profit diversion vary with the level of  investor protection k: C=C(s,k),
Ck > 0, Csk > 0, the effect of  insider ownership on market valuation should theoretically be
small in countries with high levels of investor protection (k), and for very high levels they
might become insignificant. Insignificant results on US data may therefore be explained by a
high level of investor protection simply because insider ownership is less important when
outside investors are protected by the law. In contrast, if the level of investor protection is
lower in continental Europe than in the US,  the effect of insider ownership should in theory
be larger and more likely to be statistically significant as we observe to be the case.
Future research in this area could go in several directions. Our findings indicate that it is still
necessary to take nation effects into account, and there is still a relative scarcity of European
compared to US evidence. One concern that should be addressed is that the present paper has
studied level effects, which document the relative efficiency of high levels of insider
ownership in continental Europe. But there is anecdotal evidence that many European
companies are currently undergoing rapid restructuring and increasingly diversifying their
ownership and that this is appreciated by the stock markets. Future research could address
this issue by focusing more on the relationship between changes in insider ownership and
changes in market value.
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Table 1. Summary of the five hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 5
Equations All
companies
Family
ownership
Financial
ownership
Corporate
ownership
Government
ownership
a) Market-to-book value ->
Insider ownership
+ + + + -
b) Insider ownership ->
Market-to-book value
+ + + + -
+ = expected significant positive effect
- = expected significant negative effect
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Table 2. List of Empirical Variables.
Variable Description Definition
Insider ownership Transformation of the fraction of closely held shares (chs) for each year 1993-95.
Closely held shares are shares held by insiders including officers, directors (and
their families), trust, pension/benefit plans and shares held by another corporation
or individuals that hold more than 5%.
Log (chs/ (100-chs))
Market-to-book-value Transformation of “Market capitalization/equity” for each year 1993-95 Log (Market price-year end * Common shares outstanding/
common equity at year-end).
Market-to-book-value lagged
one year
As above, but for the years 1992-94 one lag of market-to-book-value
Standard deviation of Return of
Equity
The standard deviation of the Return on Equity for the period 1992-95
Standard deviation of Return of
Equity squared
As above, but squared
Assets Transformation of assets in US$ for each year 1993-95 Log (assets)
Average insider ownership by
industry
The average fraction of insider ownership for each of the 82 industries (4-digit
ISIC) included in the sample.
Average insider ownership by
country
The average fraction of insider ownership for each of the 11 Continental
European countries included in the sample.
Debt-equity ratio The total debt divided by equity for each year 1993-95 ((Long-term debt + short-term debt) / equity)) * 100
Growth of sales The yearly growth of sales for the year 1993-95 ((Sales - last year's sales)/last year's sales)) * 100
Average market-to-book-value
by industry
The average level of market-to-book-value for each of the 82 industries (4-digit
ISIC) included in the sample.
Average market-to-book-value
by industry
The average level of market-to-book-value for each of the 11 Continental
European countries included in the sample.
Source: The Worldscope Database (annually).
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (N=642)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1) Insider ownership 1.00
2) Market-to-book-value 0.14*** 1.00
3) Market-to-book-value lagged one year 0.13*** 0.85*** 1.00
4) Standard deviation of Return on Equity 0.19*** -0.15*** -0.19*** 1.00
5) Standard deviation of Return on Equity squared 0.17*** -0.10*** -0.12*** 0.93*** 1.00
6) Assets -0.009 0.21*** 0.23*** -0.02 -0.02 1.00
7) Average insider ownership by industry 0.35*** -0.01 -0.05 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.11*** 1.00
8) Average insider ownership by country 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.02 0.06 0.43*** 0.15*** 1.00
9) Debt-equity-ratio 0.003 -0.20*** -0.19*** 0.33*** 0.30*** -0.18***  0.07* -020* 1.00
10) Growth of sales 0.004 0.19*** 0.14*** -0.07* -0.04 -0.003 -0.0007  0.06 0.01 1.00
11) Average market-to-book value by industry 0.05 0.55*** 0.58*** -0.24*** -0.19*** 0.14*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.18*** 0.07* 1.00
12) Average market-to-book value by country 0.07* 0.49*** 0.50*** -0.10** -0.05 0.45*** -0.03 0.39*** -0.31*** 0.04 0.35*** 1.00
Mean -0.22 0.29 0.13 12.69 332 7.69 0.20 0.43 138  9.99 0.32 0.30
       Standard Deviation 1.48 0.66 0.68 13.12 835 1.38 1.03 0.65 118 19.50 0.36 0.32
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Table 4. Simultaneous equations estimated in a three-stages-least-square model (3SLS) with an instrument variable
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Insider ownership Market-to-book value
Intercept                    0.61*                        -0.17***
Market-to-book-value lagged one year                    0.53***
Standard deviation of Return on Equity                    0.05***
Standard deviation of Return on Equity squared                   -0.0005*
Assets                   -0.21***
Average insider ownership by industry                    0.45***
Average insider ownership by country                    0.57***
Insider ownership                        0.09***
Debt-equity-ratio                       -0.0001
Growth of sales                        0.005***
Average market-to-book value by industry                        0.77***
Average market-to-book value by country                        0.66***
Number of observations                     642                          642
F-value                   30.14***                        97.28***
R-square                    0.22                         0.43
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Table 5.  Simultaneous equations estimates by identity of the largest owner
IDENTITY OF LARGEST OWNER
FINANCIAL COMPANY FAMILY GOVERNMENT
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Ownership
concentration
Market-to-
book value
Ownership
concentration
Market-to-
book value
Ownership
concentration
Market-to-
book value
Ownership
concentration
Market-to-
book value
Intercept     -0.05       0.10      0.33       -0.19***      0.73      -0.04      2.51***      -0.29**
Market-to-book-value lagged one year      0.99***      0.74***      0.44***     -0.68***
Standard deviation of Return on Equity      0.05**      0.06**      0.03      0.01
Standard deviation of Return on Equity
squared
    -0.0002     -0.0008**     -0.0003     -0.00005
Assets     -0.24**     -0.20***     -0.20***     -0.35***
Average insider ownership by industry      0.40***      0.43***      0.41***      0.51***
Average insider ownership by country      0.61***      0.81***      0.51***      0.33*
Insider ownership     0.22***       0.09***       0.04     -0.20**
Debt-equity-ratio    -0.0007      -0.0002      -0.0005     -0.0004
Growth of sales     0.003       0.006***       0.004*      0.006*
Average market-to-book value by
industry
    0.77***       0.54***       1.03***      0.73***
Average market-to-book value by
country
    0.63       0.87***       0.23*      0.67***
Number of observations       109       109       258         258       182        182        90        90
F-value      9.84***     16.87***     13.38***       37.34***     11.30***     35.79***      6.70***     10.42***
R-square      0.36      0.45      0.24         0.42      0.28        0.50      0.32       0.38
